ESSAY IN MEMORY OF HON. SAMUEL KAYODE FAMILONI (SK), EKITI DIVISIONAL SECRETARY/TREASURER, WORLD WAR 2, WHO DIED SEVENTY YEARS AGO ON DECEMBER 12, 1955

SECURITY AND AGRARIAN CONFLICT IN THE TINUBU ERA. By ProfKAFamiloni (Research Assistant: ChatGPT)

December 12, 2025.

Introduction

The first years of President Bola Ahmed Tinubu’s administration have unfolded against the backdrop of a deepening rural security crisis and a long-running agrarian conflict that has reshaped Nigeria’s political economy of land, livelihoods and violence. Farmer–herder clashes, cattle rustling, banditry and kidnapping have combined to make large swathes of the countryside effectively ungoverned spaces.

These trends intersect with food insecurity, youth unemployment and the collapse of confidence in state institutions.Against this background, President Tinubu’s recent directive ordering a nationwide security overhaul and instructing the National Economic Council (NEC) to convert appropriate grazing reserves into ranches marks an important policy signal. It is, at least in intent, an attempt to treat security, agriculture and land use as an integrated problem rather than a series of disconnected crises.

This essay examines the significance and limits of that shift, the risks embedded in the current approach, and the reforms required if these directives are to translate into durable peace and rural transformation.Agrarian Conflict and the Nigerian State.

Historically, agrarian conflict in Nigeria has arisen at the intersection of three dynamics: ecological change, demographic pressure and institutional weakness. Climate variability and desertification in the northern belt have pushed pastoralist groups southwards in search of water and pasture. At the same time, population growth and commercial agriculture have intensified competition for land, wetlands and forest resources.In principle, the state should mediate these pressures through land-use planning, rural infrastructure, justice institutions and security provision. In practice, the Nigerian state has often been absent or predatory in rural areas.

The Land Use Act vests land in state governors, but land administration is opaque and heavily politicised. Local government structures are weak, while customary authorities have been drawn into factional local struggles.What might have been relatively low-level disputes over crops and grazing rights have therefore escalated into lethal farmer–herder conflicts, frequently overlaid by ethnic, religious and regional narratives. In many zones, these conflicts interact with kidnapping and banditry, as armed groups exploit the vacuum of authority in forests and rural corridors. The result is a crisis that is simultaneously agrarian and security-related.

From Grazing Routes to Ranching: A Tentative Policy Pivot

Earlier federal responses tended to emphasise the revival or protection of “grazing routes” and reserves designated in the 1960s and 1970s for pastoral movement. This approach has become increasingly untenable. Many of the historic grazing reserves have been encroached upon or transformed into towns, farms or industrial projects; mapping and boundaries are contested; and affected communities view any effort to re-establish such routes as an assault on their land rights.
Tinubu’s directive appears to signal a pivot away from this outdated paradigm towards modern livestock systems based on ranching and livestock settlements. By mandating the NEC to work with state governments to identify existing grazing reserves and villages that can be rehabilitated and converted into ranches or livestock hubs, the administration aligns itself with international best practice and longstanding recommendations of Nigerian agricultural experts.

In principle, ranches allow for more intensive production, improved animal health, lower environmental degradation and better predictability of land use, while reducing friction between mobile herds and sedentary farmers.

Crucially, the President’s statement recognises that land is constitutionally vested in the states and that governors must decide which areas, if any, can be made available for such schemes. This acknowledgement is important. Attempts to impose livestock policies from Abuja in the past have run into fierce resistance, particularly in southern and Middle Belt states where memories of violent clashes are acute and where “grazing” has become a politically toxic term.

The Tinubu approach therefore attempts to strike a balance: a national framework and direction, but state-level decision-making over land and implementation.

Security Overhaul: Rebalancing the Coercive Apparatus

resolution mechanisms (e.g. mediation panels, customary courts with clear guidelines, or specialised magistrate processes) to handle crop damage, livestock theft and boundary disputes; • Clear compensation rules, backed where possible by insurance schemes, to avoid cycles of reprisal when losses occur.Embedding these mechanisms from the outset helps prevent ranches from becoming new hotspots of grievance.

2. Rural Security and Institutional Rebalancing2.1. Codify and monitor the redeployment of police from VIP dutiesThe decision to withdraw a significant proportion of police officers from VIP protection should be formalised through: • Clear regulations and guidelines issued by the Police Service Commission and the Inspector-General of Police, setting out who qualifies for police protection and under what conditions; • Annual publication of data on the number and percentage of officers deployed to VIP duties versus those posted to communities and rural areas; • Targets for progressive reduction of VIP-related deployments and reallocation of officers to high-risk rural zones.This would make reversal politically costly and create a basis for civil society and legislative oversight.

2.2. Clarify mandates and coordination among security actors in rural areasGiven the proliferation of security agencies and outfits, government should produce a Security Architecture White Paper that: • Defines the mandates, jurisdictions and rules of engagement for forest guards, NSCDC units (including Agro-Rangers), the Police, the military and recognised community vigilante groups;

• Establishes joint operations centres at zonal or state level to ensure shared intelligence, coordinated patrols and clear command structures; • Sets out criteria for when and how the military may be deployed internally, including timelines and exit strategies, to avoid permanent militarisation of rural governance.Clarity of roles reduces duplication, inter-agency rivalry and abuses